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PROBLEM OF PRESERVING EXCLUDED EVIDENCE
IN THE APPELLATE RECORD
BY WILLIAM WIRT BLUME*

B EroRE any present-day appellate court wqill consider an assignment of error complaining of the erroneous exclusion of
evidence, it will, in practically all cases, insist on having before it
the evidence complained of. The reasons are obvious. In those
cases where the appellate court has power to rehear the evidence
it must consider any erroneously excluded evidence in determimng
what judgment should be entered. In cases where the appellate
court does not have power to rehear the evidence, it must decide
whether the error, if any, is sufficiently prejudicial to justify
reversal. To perform properly either of these functions the
court must have access to the evidence in question.
In deciding whether prejudice has resulted from the erroneous exclusion of evidence three questions should be answered.
1. Could the complaining party actually have produced the
evidence, if permitted?
2. If admitted, could the evidence properly have changed
the result below '

3. After adding the evidence does the truth seem identical
with the finding or the verdict?2
If the complaining party could not actually have produced

the evidence complained of, or if it could not properly have led
to a different result below, or if, after such evidence has been
added, the truth seems identical with the finding or the verdict,
certainly there is no prejudice that will justify reversal. In cases
where the appellate court has power to rehear the evidence, if
prejudicial error does appear, a fourth question must be answered,
viz.,
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
'State v. Beaudet, (1885) 53 Conn. 536, 539.
21 Wigmore, Evidence, 2d ed., p. 205.
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4. With the rejected evidence added what judgment should
be rendered?
Before an appellate court can answer adequately the above
questions, it must have before it not only the rejected evidence,
but all the evidence in the case, or at least all bearing on the
matter in dispute. Furthermore, the rejected evidence must be
in such form that the appellate court may determine its materiality
and judge its value. To answer the first question the court must
have definite assurance that the offered evidence would have been
forthcoming
The chief difficulty connected with the preservation of rejected evidence centers around the offer of oral testimony where
the witness is ruled incompetent or where answers to questions
are not admitted. No difficulty arises where written evidence is
rejected, the documents are in court and may be easily marked
for identification and incorporated in the record. Where depositions or particular answers to questions in depositions are excluded
they also may easily be made a part of the appellate record. The
same is true where answers to oral questions have been admitted
and later stricken from the shorthand record. But where a
witness is declared incompetent and not allowed to testify at all,
or where a question is asked and no answer is permitted, a perplexing problem is presented.
PRESUMED PREJUDICE

Before examining some of the attempted solutions of the
problem of how rejected testimony may be preserved in the
appellate record, it may be well to notice a rather curious survival
of the old doctrine of presumed prejudice. In a fairly recent
case it was held by an Ohio dourt of appeals that where a witness
has been improperly rejected by the trial court as incompetent to
testify in the case, a reviewing court will hold that the party
offering the witness has been prejudiced by his exclusion even
though the facts he was expected to prove are not shown by the
appellate record.' Similar rulings have been made in recent years
3
Schlarman v. Heyne, (1923) 19 Ohio App. Rep. 64, 66 quoting from
syllabus of Wolf v. Powner, Ex'r, (1876) 30 Ohio St. 472. In the latter
case it was said. "It is not shown by the record in this case what
the plaintiffs expected to prove by the witness, Louis Wolf, and it may be
that the plaintiffs were not, in fact, prejudiced by his rejection. Will such
prejudice be presumed? In Hollister v. Regnow, (1858) 9 Ohio St. 1,
the rule on this subject is thus stated, and supported by authority- 'Where
the witness offered is rejected, as incompetent to testify, the court will
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by other courts, but it, is uncertain whether the intention was to
presume prejudicei: or- whether the courts overlooked the problem
of prejudice and were thnking only of the admissibility of the
evidence..In -such a case the supreme court of Arkansas held
that it is unnecessary to preserve-the evidence "because it must
be presumed the court would have excluded the evidence however
material it may-have been." 4 Contra, the supreme court of Georgia
has rematkedi.,thaf',no matter how competent,a, witness might be,
a court-wilinot grantanewx trial merely,beczause he was not allowed
tor testify. -It ,must appear that the, excluded, testimony was
4
material." 5
- -Of courser if-ia -witness is said, tobe: incompetent as to any
and -all matters; e,g.Athat a.ichild- is.too young to be a witnessi
neither the-,questiofis ,asked. nor the- answers- expected are of any
impoftance-mtpassing.on the:question oif competency, but questions
(1) as to. -&hetherthere-.is error and, (2) whether the. error is
prejudicial, are-entirely. different. questions.f Although it may happen that the -trial court is-.notv interested in -knowing whether
offered evidence is:,'material' in passing onthe question of admissibility, it does. not!follow, that the appelat-,court As not interested
in. its:imateriality'lm passg-, on the 'qluestion or.prejudice, or ia
proceeding to as.finalhearing of-,the case.
iPRESERVING ONLY THE QUESTIONS

21',:In:a, number of opimn ns,the Supreme.Court of the United
Sfatesi has. ;:emphasized the )principle..that. a,-party, complaining:,of
thererroneous exclusion.of -evidencecmust1showy that -he.has :.een
mjured-,-byuthe,,ruling.,! As.earlyLa;187l the, g9urt rules provid.ed
that:,
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,
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-:.-&W
.he:the.
error allegedis,,to; the, admission or yrejectiomt of
evidence, .te;s ec fcati0n shall quote ;thefull substance of the evith bill of exceos.
dence offered, ,or copy the offer as statedi
---- Under-this-rule,-as-modif~l~d- n-1872,it -ivas said- that itie
hold that thpary -ffeiinjthe iitness" has -been prejifdiced, by his exclusion,
though-'tie facts 'he,as' expected to .prove are nof-stated-the ground of
the exclusionbemg-;:iog
lly.-brrjpective" oFthe subject-:atte'r 'of 'his testimon4." Approvdig'-ths rue,- as -ve do,'fhe ,ujlgment. of the court- bilow

Ins ,- fo tRdr' iinproper,-ex lusion 6f ff l wihiess-offered, 'b reversed."
4'Shepard v. Mendenhall, (1917) 127 Ark. 44, 48, 191-1So. 1209.
5"Griffi.iP
Hend'&soii -(1903) '117 'Ga.382,' 383;-43 S. E ,712.611 .Wallace,
ix,,
,
:-14, T"-fIe,.-ktii'
e-21 Sec. 6. ' When-the-error alleged is 'to the
admisslon or'--oitherejectionI,6f -evidence, the 'specificaion slial|, quote
1
I- the full substance of the evidence admitted or rejected."
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bill of exceptions must make it appear that if the evidence had
been admitted it might have led the jury to a different verdict, 8 or,
as stated in another case decided in 1874, "it must affirmatively
appear that the ruling excepted to affected or might have affected
the decision of the case."'
In 1875 it was held that in equity
cases rejected evidence must be taken down, or its substance
stated in writing, and made a part of the record, so that, in case
the ruling upon the exceptions be reversed, the appellate court
might still proceed to hearing without remanding the cause in
order that the proof be taken. A written offer of proposed testimony was held to be insufficient. 10
The above requirement for equity cases has been retained,"1
but in law cases the usefulness of the old court rule was largely
destroyed first, by holding that when an offer of testimony is
made and rejected, if there is nothing to indicate bad faith, the
"appellate court must assume that the proof could have been
made," 2 and second, by holding that the "rule does not apply
where the witness testifies in person, and where the question
propounded to him is not only proper in form, but is so framed
as to clearly admit of an answer favorable to the claim or defense
of the party producing him." 13 The rule itself has been omitted
from the latest Supreme Court rules, but appears still to be a
requirement of most of the circuit courts of appeal.1 4 Interpreting
the requirement in light of the Supreme Court's holdings, the
circuit court of appeals, second circuit, in a fairly recent case
pointed out that where the evidence rejected is documentary, the
documents must be embodied in the assignment of the error,
"But where a question is asked, and no answer is permitted, there
is no evidence to 'quote,' ad the question for the reviewing court
is whether the excluded question was 'so framed as to clearly
admit of an answer favorable to the claim or defense' of the
interrogating party "11 The courts of the District of Columbia
8
Packet
9

Co. v. Clough, (1874) 87 U. S. 528, 542, 22 L. Ed. 406.
Railroad Co. v. Smith, (1874) 88 U. S. 255, 261, 22 L. Ed. 513.
3OBIease v. Garlington, (1875) 92 U. S. 1, 3, 7-8, 23 L. Ed. 521.
"Federal Equity Rule 46, quoted in note 26, infra.
12Scotland County v. Hill, (1884) 112 U. S. 183, 186, 9 Sup. Ct. 93,
28 L. Ed. 692. Also see Mo. Pac. Ry. v. Castle, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1909)
172 Fed.
841, 844.
23Buckstaff v. Russell, (1894) 151 U. S. 626, 636, 14 Sup. Ct. 448,
38 L.4 Ed. 292.
' Williams, Federal Practice 710. See case cited in note 15, infra.
15Victor Talking Machine Co. v. Straus, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1921) 280
Fed. 717, 718.
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and of various states, notably Maryland, have also held that it
is sufficient to preserve only the question where it admits of an
answer relevant to the issues and favorable to the party calling the
witness.' 6
With only the offer or question preserved in the record it is
necessary for the appellate court to presume that the witness knew
something to answer and would have answered favorably to the
interrogating party. Attacking this presumption in a vigorous
dissenting opinion Mr. Justice Salinger of the Iowa supreme
court declared that:
"It would be a judicial scandal to promulgate a judicial announcement that a witness is under a species of implied contract to
furnish a memory adequate to the needs of the party calling him,
and to answer questions m such way only as will benefit that
party 17
STATING THE EXPECTED ANSWER

The most commonly employed method of preserving rejected
testimony is for the interrogating lawyer to state for the purposes
of the record the testimony expected from the witness. This
method has been condemned on various grounds. In Buckstaff v.
Racssell the Supreme Court of the United States remarked that
the practice might be very inconvenient and would often be
the means of leading or instructing the witness. 8 The supreme
court of Georgia, while favoring the practice, was "well aware
that the rule may be perverted into a means of getting inadmissible
evidence before the jury, or, by forcing their constant withdrawal
to retard the trial." 19 On this point it has been said
'GUnited States v. Chichester Chemical Co., (D.C. App. 1924) 298
Fed. 829, 831. The court said. "This rule prevails also in many state
courts, notably Maryland, (citing Maryland, Massachusetts, Vermont U. S.
cases).
We regard the foregoing rule of practice as authoritative, and
as especially applicable to this case, since the prior testimony of the witness
herein made it apparent what answer the interrogating counsel expected
from him. 3 Corpus Juris, p. 827 'Appeal and Error.'"
'1American Express Co. v. Des Moines Natl. Bank, (1916) 177 Iowa
478, 509, 152 N. W 625. In this case the court followed Mitchell v.
Hercourt, (1883) 62 Iowa 349, 17 N. W 581, where it was said. "The
true rule, we think, is tha, when it is apparent on the face of the question
asked the witness what the evidence sought to be introduced is, and that
it is material, this is sufficient." In a fifteen-page dissenting opinion
Salinger, J., pointed out various objections to the rule followed by the
majority, maintaining that the correct practice is to require a statement
of the expected evidence.
18(1894) 151 U. S. 626, 636, 637, 14 Sup. Ct. 448, 38 L. Ed. 292.
'Griffin v. Henderson, (1903) 117 Ga. 382, 384, 43 S. E. 712.
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"In stating offers to prove, counsel often get a matter before
the jury in a stronger and more harmful form than they could
if allowed to elicit the facts from the witness. The effort to keep
out the evidence arouses the attention of the jury, and they give
heed to all that passes with lively interest, so that the offered
evidence is almost sure to find a lodgment in their minds, notwithstanding the fact that they may be instructed to disregard
the statements, and consider only the evidence delivered to them.
These statements blend themselves with the legitimate facts, and
influence the minds of the jurors in spite of all that can be done.
An impressive
statement of an offer to prove is a very dangerous
20
thing."

In addition to the above objections to the statement method
of preserving rejected testimony, there is still another that should
be noticed. Although the lawyer offering a witness has stated
what he expects to prove by him, what assurance has the reviewing court that the witness would have made good the offer? The
The New York court of appeals hps said.
"It may be that, had their offer been admitted, they would
have produced in fact no evidence to sustain it or prevent a recovery, but in Considering the validity of their exception to the
have fully covexclusion, we must assume that the evidence would
21
ered the propositions contained in the offer."
'. It is' easy to make such an assumption, but is an appellate
court justified in doing so? Courts must be able to rely on the
st tements of lawyers who practice before them, but it is common
knowledge that' answers given in court under oath often vary
greatly from those indicated before the trial. It also often happens that matters must be gone 'into on the trial which were not
discussed in the pre-trial interviews with the witness, and it may
be that the witness knows nothing of the matter. Although the
interrogating lawyer may be willing to hazard a guess as to what
the withess would have said if permitted to testify, should an applate court be willing to reverse a case and order a new trial so
the witness may have an opportunity to say, "I do not know ?"
"That this is not unlikely to occur is shown by the experience
of all practicing lawyers, who have often seen a long and heated
argument, as to the right to ask a question, followed by the laughter
of. all bystanders when the court held it competent, and the witness
replied that he knew nothing about the matter.!'"
Elliott, ,General Practice, (1894) Sec. 587
2Hays v. Hathorn, (1878)74 N. Y. 486, 488.
"Griffin v. Henderson, (1905) 117 Ga. 382, 384, 43 S. E. 712.
292

PRESERVING EXCLUDED EVIDENCE
TAKING THE TESTIMONY

According to the supreme court of Tennessee the 'most approved practice' is to have the testimony given in court in the
absence of the jury 23 This practice is simple and meets all the
needs of the reviewing court. The question of whether a rejecion is prejudicially erroneous can be passed on without resort to
uncertain presumptions. The chief objection to the practice is
its drain on the time of the trial courts. The practice requires
judge and jury to sit idly by while counsel put into the record an
endless amount of testimony which has been declared by the trial
judge to be, and most likely is, inadmissible. Such practice is, to
say the least, not conducive to a speeding up of the wheels of
justice. The force of this objection is apparent when, as in a
recent Tennessee case,2 4 the number of witnesses has been limited
for the very purpose of hurrying along the proceedings of the trial.
In cases where a rehearing of the evidence in the appellate
court is permitted, if rebutting evidence is allowed to be taken
along with the rejected testimony, the reviewing court can make
final disposition of the case without reference or delay As stated
by the supreme court of Michigan
"In this way the case is disposed of without the necessity of
sending it back in case it should appear that competent evidence
was excluded.2 5 - . The effect of a contrary practice can very easily
be-imagined.

In Oregon and other states statutes have been adopted providing that where testimony is excluded in chancery cases the
offering party shall be entitled to have it taken down in like manner as testimony admitted, but specially marked and separately
preserved in the appellate record.2 The use of this method is
23

Truslov v. State, (1895) 95 Tenn. 189, 198, 31 S. W 987. The
court said. "Of course it was not the duty of the court to permit counsel,
in the presence of the jury, to detail testimony which it had pronounced
immaterial or incompetent. The most approved practice in such cases is
for the jury to retire and the witness to testify in respect of the excluded
evidence in the presence of the court. Another mode of preserving the
exception is for counsel to write out at the time what is expected to be
proved by the witness, and hand it to opposing counsel, since adversary
counsel may- not agree that the witness would answer as stated, and
may wish the witness interrogated." Also see Conlee v. Taylor, (1926)
153 Tenn.
507, 285 S. W 35.
24
Conlee v. Taylor, (1926) 153 Tenn. 507, 285 S. W 35.
2Bilz v. Bilz, (1877) 37 Mich. 116, 118.
-6Oregon, Laws, 1925, ch. 80. (Testimony, How and When Taken
n-r
Equity Cases) Where evidence is offered by any of the parties, and
excluded by the ruling of the court, the party so offering the testimony
shall be entitled to have the same taken down in like manner as the
testimony admitted, but the same shall be marked and designated as
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not as objectionable in non-jury as in jury cases, yet it renders the
trial judge powerless to cut off the flow of testimony, no matter
how immaterial, and takes his time, no matter how pressed with
business."
AFF1IDAVITS OR DEPOSITIONS

In Kansas a statute regulating motions for new trials provides that
"In all cases where the ground of the motion is error in the exclusion of evidence,
such evidence shall be produced at the
hearing of the motion by affidavit, deposition or oral testimony of
the witnesses, and the opposite party may rebut the same in like
manner."28
The courts hold that a ruling excluding evidence is not open
to review unless such evidence is thus produced at the hearing of a
29
motion for new trial.
evidence offered, excluded and excepted fo. The party offering said
testimony shall be.required to pay for taking such testimony so excluded,
"
unless the court on appeal may hold the same was competent.
Michigan Judicature Act 1915, Compiled Laws, 1915, sec. 12493.
"In all chancery cases, the court shall rule upon all objections to the
competency, relevancy or materiality of testimony, or evidence offered,
the same as in suits at law- and in all cases where the court is of the
opinion that any testimony offered is incompetent, irrelevant, or immaterial, the same shall be excluded from the record. Provided, however
That if the testimony so offered and excluded is brief, the court may
in its discretion permit the same to be taken down by the stenographer
separate and apart from the testimony received in the case; and in
case of appeal, such excluded testimony may be returned to the appellate court under the certificate of the trial court. Provided further
That where such excluded testimony is not taken and returned to the
supreme court on appeal, if upon the hearing of such appeal, the supreme court shall be of the opinion that any such testimony is competent and material, it may order the same to be taken by deposition,
or under a reference, and returned to said court."
Cf. Federal Equity Rule 46. "When evidence is offered and excluded, and the party against whom the ruling is made excepts thereto
at the time, the court shall take and report so much thereof, or make
such a statement respecting it, as will clearly show the character of ttle
evidence, the form in which it was offered, the objections made, the
ruling, and the exception. If the appellate court shall be of opinion
that the evidence should have been admitted, it shall not reverse the
decree unless it be clearly of opinion that material prejudice will result from an affirmance, in which event it shall direct such further
steps2 7 as justice may require."
Fayerweather v. Ritch, (C.C.N.Y 1898) 89 Fed. 529. Syllabus:
"Under the rules governing appeals in equity, requiring all the evidence,
though excluded by the trial court, to be incorporated in the record on
appeal, a circuit court has no authority to deny a party the right to
take testimony because it deems such testimony irrelevant." In the
opinion the court remarked that the continued taking of testimony
would have been a hardship on defendant were it not for a stipulation
relieving
him of the necessity of being present to object, etc.
28
Kansas, Rev. St. 1923, Sec. 60-3004.
29See Clark v. Morris, (1913) 88 Kan. 752, 757 129 Pac. 1195, and
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Where rejected evidence has been taken by affidavit or deposition and thus preserved in the appellate record the reviewing court has before it all that is necessary for a determination of
the question of prejudice. The court can determine whether the
rejected evidence is 'material' and may feel reasonably sure if
the case is reversed the complaining party can actually produce
it. One purpose of the Kansas statute was "to prevent the defeated party from seeking a reversal for error in the exclusion of
evidence which, had the ruling been in his favor, he might not have
been able to produce."'io
For cases in which the reviewing court may rehear the evidence, preservation of rejected testimony by affidavit would not be
sufficient even though the opposite party may rebut the same in
like manner, as the safeguard of cross-examination would be absent. Depositions, however, are not open to this objection, and
-where rejected testimony is thus presented to the reviewing court
the court has before it all that is necessary for the so-called trial
de novo.
Where excluded testimony is presented by affidavit or deposition the time of the trial court is not consumed with the taking
of testimony which in the opinion of the trial judge is inadmissible, and which very likely will not be needed by the appellate
court.
It would seem that the practice of preserving rejected testimony by affidavit and or deposition is subject to fewer objections
than any other practice noticed, but the problem is not solved.
Even if rejected testimony is preserved by affidavit or deposition
should it be allowed to go into the record without limit? And who
is to bear the expense? If questions on cross-examination are excluded because they call for irrelevant matters, must the witness
bare the secrets of his life for preservation in the appellate record
on the chance that the evidence might be admissible? The matter
of cost may be taken care of by providing that the party putting
in the rejected evidence must pay the cost unless it be held by
the reviewing court that it was erroneously rejected. Where thus
paid for the quantity is immaterial, except as it flattens the appellant's purse, as the reviewing court need not look at it unless it
should have been admitted. The question of preservation where
cases cited in note following sec. 60-3004 of the Revised Statutes of
1923.
BoTreiber v. McCormack, (1913) 90 Kan. 675, 680, 136 Pac. 268.
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answers are excluded on cross-examination is not so easy, and
really raises the further question of whether the general rule
requiring rejected evidence to be preserved should be applied to
such answers. The impossibility of stating what a hostile witness
would have said, if permitted to answer a given question, is apparent. To assume that such an answer would be favorable is
absurd. It would be impossible in most cases to get such an answer
in an affidavit, and while it is possible to compel an answer in a
deposition or in oral testimony for the purpose of a motion for
new trial, would it be safe to permit such compulsion without
control on the part of the trial judge? A number of courts have
recognized the difficulties and have held that the general rule requiring the preservation of rejected testimony does not apply to
answers excluded on cross-examination. 31 The supreme court of
Kansas takes this view 32 A number of courts, however, insist
that such evidence be preserved.

33

3'Griffin v..Henderson, (1903) 117 Ga. 382, 383, 43 S. F 712. "In a
few instances there may be an exception-as in cross-examination
where the examining counsel may not know what the answer will be,
or in exercising a right to test the witness." Also see Cunningham v.
A. & N. W Ry., (1895) 88 Tex. 534, 538, 31 S. W 629, where it is
said: "The general rule is, that in order to entitle a party to a revision
of the ruling of the lower court in refusing to allow him to propound a
question to a witness, he must show what answer he expected to elicit,
in order that the court may see that he has been deprived of legitimate
evidence. This rule applies mainly to a case where a party is seeking to
introduce original evidence, the nature of which he should be expected to know before he offers the same, and is not applicable to a
case where the party is cross-examining the witness of his adversary,
with whose knowledge of the case he is not supposed to be familiar.
In this class of cases we think the better rule is, that if the question
appears on its face to be calculated to elicit competent testimony, it is
error to refuse the same, although counsel may not be able to state
to the court the answer intended or expected to be elicited. To exact
such a statement would be to require &ounsel either to speculate upon
the answer of an adverse witness, or deal unfairly with the court. Harness v. The State, (1877) 57 Ind. 1, Hutts v. Hutts, (1878) 62 Ind. 225;
O'Donnell v. Segar, (1872) 25 Mich. 367, 1 Thompson, Trials, see.
680." 2
3 McIntosh v. The Standard Oil Co., (1913) 89 Kan. 289, 291, 293,
131 Pac.
151 Leavens v. Hoover, (1915) 93 Kan. 661, 665, 145 Pac. 877
33
Holladay v. Moore, (1913) 115 Va. 66, 70, 78 S. E. 551, citing
American Bonding and Trust Co. v. Milstead, (1904) 102 Va. 683, 691,
47 S. E. 853. In the latter case it was said: "It is true counsel explained the object of the question, which goes alone to its materiality,
but fails to show what was expected to be proved by the witness, and
its materiality to the issue in the case. 'Where a question is asked, and
the witness is not permitted to answer, the bill of exceptions must show
what the party offering the witness expected or proposed to prove by
him. And the same rule applies where a question is asked on crossexamination, which the witness is not permitted to answer." Also see:
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TAXING EVIDENCE IN APPELLATE COURTS

A cursory check of law cases decided by the supreme court
of Michigan between December 8, 1926, and April 1, 1927, shows
that in sLxty-five assignments of error complaint was made of the
erroneous exclusion of evidence. Of these assignments only five
were sustained as showing prejudicial error; all the rest were
either not considered or were specifically overruled. It is not suggested that any conclusion can be drawn from these few figures,
yet they tend to confirm what is generally known to be true, viz.,
that only a few of the many assignments complaimng of the
erroneous rejection of evidence are sustained by our appellate
courts. Whether the excluded evidence be taken in the court below, added by deposition, or only stated in the record, if it be extensive-as where a witness has been excluded or a whole line of
evidence rejected-much time, labor and expense is necessary so
to prepare the appellate record that the reviewing court may proceed to a hearing or decide the question of prejudice. In cases where
witnesses have been rejected as incompetent, or whole lines of evidence have been excluded, it is apparent that to require the preservation of all of such evidence to be used by the appellate court
only if the rejection is found to be erroneous, is to require entirely
too much in view of the remoteness of the contingency. In such
cases it would seem that the only way out is for appellate courts
to be willing to have the evidence taken during the course of the
review, after error has been found.34 Such a practice would not
be desirable where mere bits of evidence have been rejected, but
where entire blocks have been excluded a substantial saving both
to the state and to the parties could be effected.
A

PRESCRIBED PRACTICE NEEDm.

In the realm of procedure it is surprising to find a practice
as indefimte as that employed in the preservation of rejected
Walker v. Rogers, (1925) 209 Ky. 619, 621, 273 S. W 439; Green v.
Freeman, (1921) 148 Ark. 654, 227 S. W 982, 984; Steeley v. Lumber
Co., (1914) 165 N. C. 27, 30, 80 S.E. 963.

34Rhode Island, Gen. L. 1923, Equity Causes (4963)
"No new testimony shall be presented to the supreme court on appeal, but in case
of accident or mistake, or erroneous ruling excluding evidence in the
superior court, the supreme court may grant leave to parties to present further evidence, and may provide by general rule or special order
for the taking of such evidence." For an illustration of practice under
this statute see case discussed in Shepard v. Springfield F & M. Ins.
Co., (1919) 42 R. I. 174, 180, 105 AtI. 576.
See Michigan Judicature Act, 1915, (12493) quoted in note 26, supra.

180

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

evidence. The courts all say that such evidence must be preserved
but are usually vague as to the method that should be used.
Statutes and court rules in most jurisdictions have consistently
failed to prescribe the practice. In one breath courts will speak
of several methods without stating which is the one desired. This
lack of system is no doubt largely due to the fact that no one
method is free from difficulty and objection, and no one is superior to the others in all situations. Flexibility in procedure is
greatly to be desired, but there must be sufficient rigidity for the
practice to be workable. While it may not be desirable to prescribe one method of preserving rejected evidence to be employed
in all situations, it is desirable to have the situations classified
and the method best suited to a particular kind of situation prescribed therefor.

